Talk:Closed system

Some title

The meme complexity of a closed system decreases over time hence intelligence without learning, economics without trade, decisions without input or ecosystems which are cut constricted by industrial development all tend toward lower complexity.

Please source this comment that complexity necessarily decreases over time in all closed systems. It appears to be easily contradicted. For example, you can consider the human population of the earth to be a closed system. There are no other inhabited planets (or if there are, they aren't talking to us). Yet human knowledge not only increases, but the very pace of knowledge continues to increase. An isolationist state may have fewer trade opportunities than a state with active connections to other states, yet it can still have a robust and growing economy based on the domestic market. Rossami 23:21, 4 May 2004 (UTC)

closed systems do not exist in nature

In the strict sense of "closed" systems, they exist only when they are formal systems because all "real systems" or "systems in nature" are open.

Thermodynamics was invented to deal with a body of steam enclosed in a cylinder with a piston.Chjoaygame (talk) 00:53, 26 January 2021 (UTC)

Definition

There doesn't seem to be much of a consistent defintion for a closed system. Some scientists define it as a system whose boundaries are impermeable to energy and mass cannot flow. Others (such as in the thermodynamics article) differentiate between closed systems and 'isolated systems' where the former applies only to mass flow and the latter applies to both matter and energy. And then there are definitions in systems theory and cybernetics, etc. which apply mainly to information flow. See also the definition closed ecological system. Methinks we should divide this article into subsections with different definitions. -Wiccan Quagga 07:35, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

Excellent point above from Wiccan Quagga regarding definitions. User Rossami's fallacy (from the viewpoint of thermodynamics) is similar to a fallacy that creationists were using on engineering campuses in the early 80s. A law of thermodynamics was held to be invalid because a tree creates a seed which grows into a tree. Either the tree or seed must obviously and self evidently be more or less complex that the other and thus the entire concept of a closed system increasing in entropy or decreasing in complexity (organization) is obviously invalid. Notice how conveniently the argument disregards sunshine adding energy to this alleged "closed system" and the waste heat radiating at the rest of the universe (background temp. of 4 degrees kelvin compared to Earth Average of ... 50 degree C?? guarantees a net heat flux).

Likewise how can one consider a population of humans a "closed system"? A human enjoys sunshine and gets a tan while surfing. A telescope can be used to observe quasars and pulsars at the other end of the perceived universe. A president has a brain hemorhage, decides he is chosen by God, and launches both the VSE and an Iraqi War. One exports metal, energy, mass and information to the moon, mars and beyond while the other blots out designated anti american terrorists (along with professional patriots) on the other side of the planet. Meteorites rain down nutrients and chemicals from the sky while salmon carry phosperous uphill to North America's Northwestern forests.

If a definition of a "closed system" exists for ecology or sociology or information theory then it should be provided rather than alleged in general terms and labeled so the readers (and wikipedians) can avoid the Garbage In Garbage Out fallacies that various groups would like to propagate to confuse the rest of us.

practicabilities... ?

I think the following sentence is slightly... vague / non-understandable. I would edit it myself but I can't decide how it was meant - replacing "practicabilities" with "feasibilities" doesn't sound right, although it is a synonym:

"Sometimes the practicabilities of thermal isolation are discussed but never whether thermal isolation is completely achievable in principle."

Seems like it needs rewording. Fresheneesz 03:13, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

toll roads?

In my opinion, toll roads and closed systems just don't belong to one another. I think that the notion of a closed system in the context of thermodynamics is so important that it should be contained in its own page and closed system toll roads should occupy another. S.riccardelli 22:40, 17 February 2007 (UTC)s.riccardelli

That section should just be moved to the Toll roads page. --George100 10:22, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Moved to Toll_road#Closed_system --George100 07:29, 3 May 2007 (UTC)

WHEN?

When the hell did closed system start NOT meaning the same as an isolated system? Fresheneesz 21:20, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

In thermodynamics "Closed system" has always been different from an "isolated system". Ϙ 18:16, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

Clarifications

In physics, there is actually four, possibly five, different conceptual developments of closed systems concepts. The first began with reference to Newtonian mechanics, the second with nineteenth century thermodynamics, the third throughout the twentieth century with Lorentz, Einstein, and Minkowski, and finally with conceptual developments in quantum theory and wave mechanics. See Heisenberg (1999) Physics and Philosophy, New York: Prometheus Books, pp. 93-109. The third and fourth stages eventually led to more open systems concepts, but closed/open system concepts really need be considered in relation to work since that time if one were to define further conceptual developments. --Kenneth M Burke 01:20, 3 August 2007 (UTC)

(... See Talk:Open system (system theory) --Kenneth M Burke 16:30, 25 August 2007 (UTC))

This is a nice story about "the conceptual developments of closed systems concepts" in physics. I copied this text into the Physical system article. - Mdd 18:44, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

Little blog

I moved the following comments from the article here. - Mdd 20:22, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

Mrs. Rykse,Kenowa Hills Middle Science teacher is currently teaching us about this stuff. She said that closed systems have to do with something about science and energy. Also about friction and stuff liek this. We are also learning about energy which includes, potential, gravitational potential, kinetic energy, and other types of energy. Hope you enjoyed my little blog!!

Thanks, next time put your comments on a discussion page. - Mdd 20:23, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

WikiProject class rating

This article was automatically assessed because at least one WikiProject had rated the article as start, and the rating on other projects was brought up to start class. BetacommandBot 09:46, 10 November 2007 (UTC)

Equation

The equation is a pretty straight forward sumation, but b^0=1; no matter what b is. Is this right? Is there a reference for this equation to check out. Thanks, Wolfworks (talk) 02:36, 28 January 2009 (UTC)

Misleading first sentence

<< A closed system is a system in the "state of being isolated from its surrounding environment." >>

Right at the beginning of the article, this suggests the concept of an isolated system, rather than a closed one. I think it doesn't do much good. 77.209.170.195 (talk) 04:16, 3 February 2010 (UTC)

Epistemological Problems With Conceptualization

The concept of a "closed system" has a fundamental problem of self-referentiality and logical circularity. If one defines it as closed to movement, exchange, or any kind of interaction beyond its boundary, then one is faced with having to show an example. There are no actual examples of systems closed in any absolute sense, as this would be impossible to detect. The postulate of an "isolated system" requires conditional definitions of the terms of isolation. Again, there is no actual example of an absolutely isolated system. Therefore, at best, these are conditions that can only occur in relative terms. All "systems" are in fact connected. There is an autopoietic theory of self-productive or self-creating systems, but these are not thermodynamically or even materially isolated. Rather, they are "isolated" only in regard to awareness, perception, or communication - as in the work of Maturana & Varela, or in the systems theory of Luhmann. But, there is a deeper problem. As Maturana & Varela readily admit, their theory is intentionally self-referential and circular, in order to exploit the notion of closure for theoretical applicability in constructing a theory of living things or systems as entirely self-organizing, and thus not subject to "higher order" control. I leave it to the reader to investigate the reasons for these, but they become necessary if one is to adhere to the strict logic of conventional science pushed to its self-contradictory extreme. This arises because of the fundamental premise of conventional science as arising from meaningless random accident - i.e., the "absurdity" premise. But, ignored in this is the problem of explaining then how either order or organization arise in the universe (or, more generally, in cosmos). Order is simply the patterning of whatever exists. Organization, however, is a process of organizing complexity. Complexity, by definition, is not meaningless random accident, but purposeful. Otherwise, there is no difference between complexity and chaos. Chaos science observes the emergence of patterns without any inherent ability to predict precisely, even though forms or structures may be discerned in the evidence or behavior. Strictly speaking, there must either be: (1) meaningless random accident; (2) chaotic order; (3) arbitrary perception; (4) imposed control; or (5) autonomous intention. If all that exists are dynamics of inertia, which is the strict claim of the first postulate, then nothing which results can actually be called "order," which is a reference to something that makes sense. If dynamics of inertia do "make sense," then something exists independently of that chaos to perceive its order. This raises the Cartesian problem of "thinking;" and therefore, the problem of explaining whence "consciousness?" That persistent Cartesian problem is indeed the one on which modern science persistently stumbles. Arbitrary perception is what happens when someone's "mind" perceives a pattern to which it attributes "meaning" when there is none. This, of course, is the skeptic premise on which much of modern scientific inquiry proceeds: the attempt to construct hypotheses which have null hypotheses which are operationally testable so as to then attempt to disprove the null hypotheses in order to be able to claim that "the hypotheses have not been disproved." This poses the conundrum that modern science can never actually prove anything - a point which Popper emphasized. All it can do at best is disprove null hypotheses in a finite set of experiments, which therefore never eliminate the possibility that the hypotheses are untrue. The imposed control is simply an extension of arbitrary perception to a presumably more powerful level of theory in which a particular outcome is predicted under conditions which are then controlled. It is assumed that empirical success validates theory, when all it really does is validate practice. For instance, the theory of "evil spirits" escaping when one fails to cover one's mouth when sneezing has plenty of empirical evidence and practical utility, if one's goal is to reduce the spread of airborne consequences of "evil spirits," but it hardly explains the reality. Conversely, with the degree of complexity of modern computational and information theory applied to biology, we could in fact reintroduce "evil spirits" at the micro level as the equivalent of malevolent "code." So, as Fayerabend observed, contrary to the usual interpretation of Kuhnian paradigms superseding older paradigms, replacing them for current utility does not actually mean supplanting them because they are either ultimately better or truer. Their viability may reemerge as practical advances make their reintroduction more feasible. Thus, the arbitrary nature of perception.... Now, autonomous intention introduces a quite different dynamic. Conventional religions tend to postulate some sort of God or master plan pulling the strings or teleologically deciding "the future." Conventional science rejects this by invoking its absurdity premise - although, Tertullian used the absurdity premise to justify a belief in miracles (paraphrasing, "It must be believed becasue it is absurd"). This problematic of absurdity is precisely the stumbling point of Descartes, who proffered dualism because of it. And, it was to evade this dualism that Maturana & Varela developed their autopoiesis theory, adopted and adapted in turn by Luhmann. But, there is no reason to endorse the absurdity premise, because it adds nothing to science. In fact, it introduces and imposes a persistent problem at every level: absurdity exists "All the way down and all the way up." The meaningless random accidental emergence of "self-organization" is no less meaningless random and accidental for having "emerged;" and thus we are left with no tenable explanation for its appearance. That we perceive it leaves us still with the persistent problem of our "perception." Where does it come from? And so, conventional science is always trying to explain whence "consciousness?" In our present problem, it appears first in the question of "what is a system?" We have to define that first, before we can define a "closed system." Let us take a very simple system and imagine how this can be done (ignoring, for the moment, how we can "imagine"). Virtual particles are said to randomly emerge from zero-point energy into the matter-antimatter of particle-anti-particles that immediately self-annihilate, leaving behind the energy "footprints" or shadows (on the wall of Plato's Cave?) of their postulated existence. The theory of the Big Bang as the way in which the universe is created (just one particularly popular version of many possible explanatory theories) exploits the idea that a "mass" conspiracy of particles and anti-particles mutually interfere with one another's self-annihilation, and thus set in motion the meaningless random accident of evolution, as the spontaneous formation of the universe thermodynamically unwinds over eons of time. Time itself is even defined by some as the thermodynamic unwinding itself, in attempting to explain how "far-from-equilibrium systems" can persist (Prigogine & Stengers). I shan't attempt to demonstrate all the problematic confusion that generates - too many people are so distracted by the empirical evidence that they don't bother to note the obvious absurdity of the theory, which literally says that as entropy increases the universe exhibits evolving self-organizing complexity. I think that is true, but therefore refutes the assumptions on which the claim is predicated, which is what paradoxical premises produce. If instead we start with a premise of intention in every emergent bit of mass (down to quarks or whatever planck-sized "bits" may be discerned), then intention is present at every level of reality "All the way down and all the way up." But, it is not operating with a master plan or God pulling the strings. Instead, every "particle" and "antiparticle" or whatever else matter consists of is exerting its own "will" or "intent" in its action. Of note, energy in the form of photons has no mass, but has one dimension of existence, its capacity to "work" or "produce change." That capacity is then manifest when it does what Bohm called changing from "implicate" to "explicate" order. If these particles/antiparticles are viewed in anthropomorphized terms, we can call them "prisoners" caught in a "dilemma" in which they can "work" or "not" both in relation to their own "emergence" and in relation to their interaction with "others." That "working" or "not" is arbitrary in one sense, because they have no awareness, even if they are said to have will or intention. They "select" paths, which then "works" or "not" with those "others" they encounter. That can produce self-annihilation or persistence, and then order and organization, or chaos and mere entropy. In the former instance, we have what we conventionally call evolution, except now, we have an explanation of what that otherwise undefined term called "selection" actually means. The simplest definition of "intention" is "will to be" - or, as Shakespeare put it: "To be, or not to be. That is the question." By means of embodying "learning" in the actual material structures of reality, evolution can proceed along a path of emergent complex organization that eventuates in the living ecology of a planet in a conducive location of a solar system within a galaxy in a universe that has every bit of matter having its own autonomous agent capacity that potentially can exploit the emergence of higher order systems when accidental conditions arise that can be exploited. The difference in premises is that "absurdity" affords no mechanism for anything but absurdity; whereas, intention is always seeking "to be." This is not because it is aware, because awareness is well known to result from forms and levels of emergent complexity in biologically supported neural systems that have the chemical and quantum (holonomic, in Pribram's terms) capacity for such awareness. We do not then seek to explain "consciousness" but only exploit its primitive form, which is simple intent without any necessary awareness, yet possessing capacity to "learn" in precisely the "forms" which matter itself assumes by embedding information (pattern) within the emergent structures and processes of reality as we "know" it. This, incidentally, is entirely consistent with the theory of "direct perception" in ecology systems. By shifting our premise in this way, we can also say that there are no "closed systems," only "closed minds" in the sense of lacking communication, cognition, perception, or awareness. This can then be explored in very different terms, and the theories of Luhmann and Maturana & Varela correspondingly reinterpreted to appreciate how a quantum theory of consciousness, like Stapp's (which has so far been shown to be thermodynamically robust), might actually operate in reality. So, to conclude, the problem with this definition reveals the deeper epistemological problem with the premise(s) of science, that need explication before either definitions can be written or properly investigated. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Omnist (talk • contribs) 16:42, 4 February 2015 (UTC)

You had me at your second sentence, "If one defines it as closed to movement, exchange, or any kind of interaction beyond its boundary, then one is faced with having to show an example." How about a warm can of soda placed in the fridge overnight? Overnight energy flows out of it, yet no matter is exchanged with its environment.

But although the matter-energy distinction on which this alleged distinction between "closed" and "isolated" is based is perfectly clear, I worry that it is far from standard in thermodynamics. I have to echo Fresheneesz's question above, "When the hell did closed system start NOT meaning the same as an isolated system?" References [3]-[9] supposedly support the distinction, but has it caught on in the teaching of thermodynamics? Vaughan Pratt (talk) 17:36, 19 July 2021 (UTC)